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The United States remains the leading economic, diplomatic, and strategic partner 
of Latin America. However, the hegemonic geopolitical influence the United States once 
exerted is arguably fading, and Beijing offers an alternative to Washington’s policies that 
have been encouraged throughout Latin America. Current research indicates a growing 
Chinese interest in Latin America that has driven tighter economic and organizational 
involvement in the region. Arguably, this growing relationship has challenged United 
States’ hemispheric policy. It has been argued that the People’s Republic of China’s 
economic contributions in Latin America may negatively affect future U.S.-led 
initiatives. This thesis addresses the variables of economic partnerships, foreign policy 
considerations, and military-to-military cooperation in order to comparatively analyze the 
relationships of China and the United States with Latin America. In doing so, this thesis 
expands on the literature and presents the geopolitical issues facing Washington as China 
attempts to expand its influence in Latin America. 
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As China’s geopolitical presence in the Western Hemisphere strengthens, this 
presence will affect economic relationships, homeland security, and the United States’ 
overall role in the region. I have investigated the development of this unique relationship 
between China, the United States, and Latin America by analyzing three key variables: 
economic relations, foreign policy, and military-to-military cooperation.  
This thesis asks the question: What are the long-term implications of the United 
States’ declining participation in Latin America, combined with China’s increasing 
interest, especially in regards to U.S. security? 
A. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH 
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States has 
concentrated its strategic efforts toward combating terrorism and attempting to bring 
stability to the Middle East. More recently, the United States has begun a pivot to the 
Pacific to balance China’s growing naval presence and other long-term interests with the 
seemingly growing importance of this region. Due to changes in U.S. foreign policy since 
9/11, relationships throughout Latin America have declined as trade with the region has 
fallen and U.S. security concerns, like the war on drugs, have been set aside. General Jim 
Kelly, commander of the United States Southern Command, stated in his most recent 
posture statement before Congress that his is the least funded combatant command 
(COCOM), and that it is difficult for him to maintain a positive presence in the region.1 
Meanwhile, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has been increasing their participation 
by growing trade relationships; gaining legitimacy in a region that once leaned more 
toward recognizing Taiwan; participating in regional organizations; and practicing 
forward military operations to Latin America. With the PRC’s growing engagement in 
the Western Hemisphere, U.S. policymakers could consider changes to the current 
doctrine. Concentrating on improving relationships throughout Latin America and re-
                                                 
1 General John F. Kelly, Posture Statement of General John F. Kelly, United States Marine Corps; 
Commander, United States Southern Command, (Washington, DC: 2015), 4. 
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energizing the U.S. Southern Command are a few ways to signal the importance of Latin 
America’s relationship with Washington. 
Contrary to the current rapport, the relationship between Latin America and the 
United States was overwhelmingly strong in the early 1990s. Some examples of this 
collaboration are the historic signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA), the Brady Relief Act, the first Summit of the Americas held in Miami, and the 
rescue initiative that prevented the collapse of the Mexican economy.2 However, from the 
mid-1990s until September 11, 2001, stagnation developed between the north and the 
south, especially as the Free Trade Area of the Americas initiative failed to pass approval 
in the U.S. Congress. In the post-9/11 era, Washington began focusing on a new 
mission—the Global War on Terror—concentrating political and military efforts in the 
Middle East and effectively neglecting Latin America. Now that the United States seeks 
to balance military forces in the Pacific and to increase trade partnerships with the Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP), Latin America continues to lack importance. 
While the United States has been concentrating its efforts elsewhere, Latin 
America’s neglect has not gone unnoticed. Increasingly, the people of the region have 
voiced general feelings of mistrust and anti-U.S. sentiment, as many consider 
Washington to be an unreliable partner.3 “Throughout the region, support for 
Washington’s policies has diminished. Few Latin Americans, in or out of government, 
consider the United States to be a dependable partner. U.S.-Latin American relations 
have seriously deteriorated.”4 Actors like China, Russia, and Iran have been cooperating 
with countries throughout Latin America while U.S. presence and favor in the region has 
fallen. China’s presence, in particular, has garnered the most attention, as the PRC’s 
efforts have been the most substantial in the economic, political, and military sectors. 
Trade continues to grow, especially in the resource sector, and as diplomatic visits 
                                                 





between the PRC and countries in Latin America have increased, so too have Chinese 
military deployments to the region. 
The influence of the PRC in Latin America could negatively affect future U.S.-led 
initiatives. For the time being, the United States remains the region’s leading economic 
partner. However, the geopolitical influence the United States once exemplified is fading, 
and Beijing offers an alternative to Washington’s policies. Chinese military operations in 
naval exercises, humanitarian aid/disaster relief, and peacekeeping operations have 
increased, thus exemplifying a larger commitment to the region. Moreover, the U.S. 
Southern Command has proven to be the lowest priority on the U.S. totem pole of 
combatant commands, and an indication to what extent Washington values partnerships 
in the Western Hemisphere. 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Geopolitics refers to the analysis of power rivalries over territories; this thesis 
investigates China and the United States acting for influence in Latin America.5 China, a 
state with the world’s largest population, estimated at 1,355,692,576 in July 2014,6 does 
not have enough domestic resources to provide for its population and industrial growth; 
trade is one of China’s major strategic goals in pursuit of continued success. There is a 
surplus of natural resources in Latin America, presenting countries throughout the region 
with opportunity to reap the benefits of exporting these resources. With that population, 
“China consumes a large share of the world’s commodities, and Latin America is the 
exporter of such products.”7 With large amounts of mining rights to resources like 
copper, oil, and iron available for sale in Latin America, the Chinese have expanded their 
presence in the region by purchasing large parcels of land and businesses, especially in 
                                                 
5 Thierrry de Montbrial, Action and Reaction in the World System: The Dynamics of Economic and 
Political Power, (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2013), 54. 
6 “The World Factbook: China,” Central Intelligence Agency, accessed August 21, 2014, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html.  
7 Barbara Stallings, “The U.S.-China-Latin America Triangle: Implications for the Future,” in China’s 
Expansion into the Western Hemisphere: Implications for Latin America and the United States, ed. Riordan 
Roett and Guadalupe Paz (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2008), 246. 
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Chile, Brazil, and Argentina.8 China has also benefited by exporting many goods to Latin 
America, where they off-load their products and gain access to the U.S. market through 
the multitude of bilateral free trade agreements Latin American countries have with the 
United States.9 
1. Sino–Latin American Relations 
Starting in 2000, China launched a campaign called “going out,” which 
encouraged companies to expand overseas; one of the regions for expansion was Latin 
America, and the PRC’s expansion into the region has been on the rise since.10 In terms 
of trade, China is the second largest partner to the region, as well as the second largest 
source of investment in the region; thus, “financial cooperation is becoming the new 
highlight of China-Latin American trade relations.”11 In July 2014, a trip to the region 
from China’s president, Xi Jinping, bolstered economic ties with further investment—
”the unifying theme of the trip…was China’s use of its enormous financial reserves (now 
more than $4 trillion dollars).”12 Those financial reserves are being used to conduct 
currency swaps with Argentina, invest in Venezuelan oil, buy oil fields in Brazil, and 
mines in Chile.13 “The huge demand of Chinese economic growth to raw material 
markets impelled the economic growth of Latin America, which has created the condition 
for Latin America to enhance trade revenue … it also plays a non-replaceable role in raw 
material and energy supply for Chinese industry.”14 
                                                 
8 Ben Laidler et al., “South-South Special: What a Globalizing China Means for LatAm,” HSBC 
Global Research, (2013): 11. 
9 Stallings, “U.S.-China-Latin America Triangle,” 247. 
10 Laidler, “South-South Special,” 8–10. 
11 Zheng Bingwen, Sun Hongbo, and Yue Yunxia, “The Present Situation and Prospects of China-
Latin American Relations: A Review of the History since 1949,” in China-Latin America Relations: 
Review and Analysis, vol. 1, ed. He Shuangrong (United Kingdom: Paths International Ltd, 2012), 8. 
12 R. Evan Ellis, “China Fills the Vacuum Left by the United States in Latin America,” University of 
Miami Center for Hemispheric Policy: Perspectives on the Americas, (2014): 2, 
https://umshare.miami.edu/web/wda/hemisphericpolicy/Perspectives_on_the_Americas/Ellis%20Final%20
Paper.pdf. 
13 Ellis, “China Fills the Vacuum,” 2–3; Laidler, “South-South Special,” 16–22. 
14 Zheng, “The Present Situation and Prospects of China-Latin American Relations,” 9. 
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Latin America is not the only region where China has sought to invest; the PRC 
has a strategy in place to strengthen ties across developing regions known as South-South 
relations. Such relationships in already exist throughout Africa, similarly “China looks to 
Latin America as a junior partner in its efforts to build commercial and diplomatic ties 
with developing countries in these regions.”15 Natural resources will continue to drive 
China’s trade in the region as “the growing importance of commodity-hungry China to 
the region reflects the unparalleled competitiveness of South America in the production 
of many commodities. South America is a chief mining and oil exporter and is becoming 
the ‘farm of the world.’”16 
The growing economic relationship between China and Latin American countries 
has resulted in increased trust and influence among these trade partners, demonstrated by 
the inclusion of China as an observer of the Organization for American States (OAS) 
since 2004, of which the United States is also a member. In 2008, China released a policy 
statement affirming the value they placed on growing their relationships with the 
countries of Latin America. 
China’s Policy Document to Latin America and the Caribbean” issued by 
the Chinese government pointed out that “the Chinese government regards 
China-Latin America relations from a strategic perspective, and devotes 
itself to establishing and developing comprehensive cooperation 
partnerships of equality and mutual benefit and the collaborative 
development with Latin American and Caribbean nations.17 
During President Xi’s 2014 visit, the Chinese delegation participated in “a ‘mini-summit’ 
with leaders of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), a 
forum organized to unite countries of the hemisphere that currently excludes the United 
States and Canada,”18 strengthening the continually growing cooperation in the region. 
Another Chinese policy initiative “is the building of a new ‘China-CELAC Forum’ … an 
effort to build a regional Latin American body to engage with China in a way that is 
                                                 
15 Matt Ferchen, interview by CAIXIN, Comparing China’s and Japan’s Latin American Policy, 
Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, August 5, 2014. 
16 Laidler, “South-South Special,” 11. 
17 Zheng, “The Present Situation and Prospects of China-Latin American Relations,” 5–6. 
18 Ellis, “China Fills the Vacuum,” 1. 
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similar to the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC).”19 Overall, this relationship 
may lead to guaranteed cooperation and opportunities for investment and infrastructure 
projects—”The projects in each of the countries Xi visited will ultimately facilitate the 
more efficient extraction of the resources in Latin America and the Caribbean by Chinese 
companies, as well as expand access to their markets by PRC products and services.”20 In 
the past, Chinese foreign policy revolved around reducing the number of countries that 
diplomatically recognized the Republic of China (ROC). Latin America was no exception 
as China appeared to be using their influence through dollar diplomacy. “Beijing also 
faces a major political challenge in the region: of the 26 countries that recognize Taiwan, 
12 are in Latin America or the Caribbean. China is intent on reducing that number 
through aggressive diplomacy and increased trade, aid, and investment.”21 This policy 
remained until a diplomatic truce was agreed on in 2008, which prevents each from 
seizing the others’ diplomatic allies. However, some of the literature expresses China’s 
continued goal of influencing a positive perception in countries that recognize the ROC 
by increasing opportunities to cooperate. 
China has also expanded its military relationship with Latin American countries, 
including “professional military education and tactical level training from the PLA, and 
in some cases, arms and equipment from Chinese vendors.”22 The People’s Liberation 
Army Navy (PLAN) has increased its cooperation with Latin American navies in the 
form of exercises, peacekeeping, and humanitarian relief. To that end, “the Chinese have 
begun to evolve from conducting limited deployments in a multilateral context 
(contributing military police to the MINUSTAH peacekeeping force in Haiti from 2004 
through 2012), to bilateral humanitarian engagements.”23 Military-to-military relations 
are increasing between China and Latin America at a time when fiscal constraints limit 
the United States’ ability to allocate additional funds to Latin American missions. This is 
                                                 
19 Ferchen, “Comparing China’s and Japan’s Latin American Policy.” 
20 Ellis, “Chinas Fills the Vacuum,” 2. 
21 Hakim, “Is Washington Losing Latin America?,” 45. 
22 R. Evan Ellis, “The Rise of China in the Americas,” Security and Defense Studies Review 16 
(2014): 94, http://chds.dodlive.mil/files/2014/08/SDSR16-final.pdf. 
23 Ibid., 95. 
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demonstrated by China “inviting Latin American foreign officers to attend the Chinese 
National Defense University [opening] a path toward aligning the militaries of these 
states to Beijing. These invitations are intended to give foreign officers a much deeper 
empathy to China’s positions.”24 
2. U.S.–Latin American Relations 
The United States once showed a greater commitment to Latin America in the 
early 1990s. These efforts include: 
The Brady debt-relief proposal … helped end Latin America’s decade-
long, debt-induced recession; the United States, Canada, and Mexico 
signed the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA); the United 
States hosted the hemisphere’s first summit meeting in more than a 
generation; and in 1995 a bold Washington-led rescue package helped 
prevent the collapse of Mexico’s economy.25  
Since then, new trade policies attempted to mirror the success of NAFTA, notably the 
Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), but this never came to fruition. Washington 
has been successful in garnering a web of bilateral trade agreements, but some aspects of 
those pacts are seen as unfair by participating Latin American countries. Many of the 
protectionist measures are seen as unnecessary: 
Still, they resent Washington’s unwillingness to compromise on most 
issues, such as the trade distorting support payments the U.S. government 
makes to U.S. farmers, harsh U.S. antidumping rules, and Washington’s 
demands for new standards of intellectual property protection. Sky-high 
tariffs and quota limitations on sugar, orange juice, cotton, and many other 
high-volume Latin American exports make the United States seem 
ungenerous.26  
Because of this, the United States has been supplanted by China in some Latin American 
countries, as China became “the number one trade partner for Chile and Brazil and ranks 
in the top five for Peru, Argentina, and Venezuela—allowing all of these countries to 
                                                 
24 Cynthia Watson, “China’s Use of the Military Instrument in Latin America: Not Yet the Biggest 
Stick,” Journal of International Affairs 66, no. 2 (2013): 106, 
http://web.b.ebscohost.com.libproxy.nps.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=cea896e6-ba8a-4898-9c17-
4e2d161491a9%40sessionmgr198&vid=5&hid=123. 
25 Hakim, “Is Washington Losing Latin America?,” 39. 
26 Ibid., 49. 
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diversify their exports away from the United States and thus lessening the sway of the 
U.S. market.”27 That said the United States is still the leading trading partner for the Latin 
American region: “U.S. exports to the region valued at more than $150 billion a year, 
almost as much as the value of its exports to the European Union. But two-thirds of that 
goes to Mexico, while Brazil and other South American markets remain relatively 
untapped in the absence of more productive hemispheric trade arrangements.”28 
Until recently, the Monroe Doctrine has guided foreign policy as it concerns 
relationships in Latin America and has driven U.S. intervention in the region. The 
Monroe Doctrine was originally aimed at removing European influence in the Western 
Hemisphere, “the U.S. government had also promoted a mostly self-serving diplomatic 
vision of hemispheric solidarity … which called for ‘European hands off’ the 
Americas.”29 There have been many examples of interventions and actions justified by 
the Monroe Doctrine throughout history, such as implementation of the Platt Amendment 
in the Cuban Constitution, the building of the Panama Canal that cut off the isthmus of 
Central America from Colombia, and changes in government regimes. However, “despite 
the litany of abuses (assumed or real), the United States gave cause and breath to real 
interests and benefits in the region. Those contributions to rights and freedoms and to 
political and economic stability became particularly true in the waning years of the Cold 
War and the decades after.”30 Examples of such benefits include the North American 
Free Trade Agreement, which has boosted the Mexican economy and increased 
cooperation with the U.S. and Canada. Plan Colombia led to the defeat of the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) insurgency and to a more stable 
Colombia. Moreover, the bilateral support of the United States and non-governmental 
organizations help states provide free and fair elections throughout the region. However, 
                                                 
27 Christopher Sabatini, “Will Latin America Miss U.S. Hegemony?,” Journal of International Affairs 
66, no. 2 (2013): 10, EBSCOhost 
http://web.b.ebscohost.com.libproxy.nps.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=9&sid=cea896e6-ba8a-4898-
9c17-4e2d161491a9%40sessionmgr198&hid=123.  
28 Hakim, “Is Washington Losing Latin America?,” 40. 
29 John Charles Chasteen, Born in Blood and Fire: A Concise History of Latin America, 3rd ed. (New 
York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2011), 145. 
30 Sabatini, “Will Latin America Miss U.S. Hegemony?,” 8. 
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even though some of the U.S. interventions yielded progressive results, the history of 
unprovoked intervention remains a sensitive issue throughout the region. Points of 
contention against Washington’s policies remain, such as “a greater willingness to 
challenge U.S. positions on drug policy or question the wisdom of its Cuba policy [but] 
should not be mistaken for broad-based opposition to the United States.”31 Nonetheless, 
there is a perception of waning U.S. leadership in the region. One example is U.S. 
participation in regional institutions’ and their ability to resolve intra-regional issues. 
Indications of diminishing U.S. influence can be seen the reduced role of 
U.S.-led institutions such as the Organization of American States in 
resolving important regional issues such as political succession in 
Honduras and Paraguay, the weakened ability of Washington to advance 
its position in key regional forums such as the Summit of the Americas, 
and the proliferation of new sub-regional institutions with explicitly 
exclude the U.S. such as UNASUR and CELAC.32 
Latin America is doing more on their own and referring to international judiciary bodies 
or smaller regional blocs to settle disputes. The U.S. is concentrating elsewhere and these 
organizations are building their legitimacy to act without (the sometimes unwelcome) 
United States. Latin America is turning inward to resolve socio-political issues without 
attempting to appease external powers. 
The U.S. military’s role in Latin America has evolved from the strategic 
placement and training of forces as it benefited Washington to a more hands-off approach 
geared toward humanitarian aid and security partnerships. 
The era in which the United States could unilaterally send in its marines to 
occupy a country has ended. One need only see the fraught debate over 
actual U.S. military involvement in Mexico’s recent war on 
narcotraffickers to realize that military intervention (even at the invitation 
of the local government) in Latin American countries is conditioned on 
international and domestic politics and norms.33 
However, Washington has attempted to show that it continues to view Latin American 
countries as an important military ally, especially as they sought a coalition for the 
                                                 
31 Ibid., 11. 
32 Ellis, “The Rise of China in the Americas,” 95. 
33 Sabatini, “Will Latin America Miss U.S. Hegemony?,” 9. 
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Global War on Terror, which has also come to encompass the war on drugs. In July 2008, 
the U.S. Navy re-established the Fourth Fleet. Then-Chief of Naval Operations Admiral 
Gary Roughead, said, “reestablishing the Fourth Fleet recognizes the immense, 
importance of maritime security in the southern part of the Western Hemisphere, and 
signals our support and interest in the civil and military maritime services in Central and 
South America.”34 The Fourth Fleet’s area of responsibility encompasses “South 
America, Central America, the Caribbean, and surrounding waters”35 and is “tasked with 
combating terrorism, keeping sea lanes free and open, countering illicit trafficking, and 
providing humanitarian assistance.”36 However, the commitment to this fleet is 
questionable, as Fourth Fleet does not have any organic, or permanently controlled, 
Naval assets to deploy. Nonetheless, General Kelly has been successful in his use of 
Fourth Fleet when he was able to acquire assets. 
Time and again—whether during Plan Colombia or Operation UNIFIED 
RESPONSE in Haiti; whether in an interdiction operation that denies drug 
traffickers billions of dollars in revenue; or in multinational training 
exercises that improve the capability of regional armies, air forces, 
marines, navies, and special operations forces—our partnerships are the 
key enablers for ensuring regional security.37 
Regardless of economic constraints and military operations being performed by U.S. 
forces abroad, military assets will be flexible and ready to respond to crises that may 
upset the stability of the Western Hemisphere. 
In sum, the literature clearly describes a rise of influence and participation from 
China throughout Latin America. The PRC’s growing economic advantage has presented 
the opportunity to engage in the global market, finding access to resources it needs to 
provide for its growing domestic consumption. The opportunity for economic growth by 
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Latin American countries has encouraged many to find ways to engage with the strong 
Chinese market. The Chinese-Latin American economic partnership has opened new 
markets for resources and sparked economic growth respectively. In order to maintain 
this relationship with Latin American markets the PRC continues to conduct peer 
exchanges and set up institutions to encourage the understanding of culture and norms. 
Furthermore, military-to-military cooperation is on the rise as deployments, arms sales, 
and professional military education opportunities increase, which afford the growth of 
new alliances. However, there does not seem to be any real correlation in the increased 
Chinese participation within Latin America and the perceived decline of U.S. interest in 
the region. The U.S. economy has a slower growth rate than that of China and the 
protectionist measures implemented by Washington inhibit greater economic 
cooperation, restricting trade to bilateral opportunities rather than the regional FTAA 
once sought. Washington’s foreign policy agenda and military strategy are both aimed at 
other regions that offer a greater security threat to the United States. Furthermore, past 
experiences by U.S. foreign policy initiatives and military operations have left many in 
the region with a general distrust which has made partnerships outside of the United 
States an attractive option. The growing presence of China appears to be welcomed by 
the countries of Latin America as an alternative to the United States. 
C. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
My research suggests that Chinese economic and political influence is growing in 
Latin America. China’s relationship with Latin America is valuable because of the 
natural resources Latin America provides to China as it strives to continue growing 
economically and industrially. Latin America enjoys China’s foreign direct investments, 
infrastructure projects, and a trading partner with a steady, yearly economic growth rate. 
Although some countries in Latin America are sacrificing parts of their material industrial 
capability by importing cheaper Chinese products and technology, this is outweighed by 
the seemingly positive impact China’s investment is having in Latin American 
economies. Furthermore, the network of bilateral free trade agreements the United States 
has established throughout Latin America benefits Chinese exports. China also continues 
to grow as a military power and has begun to project power abroad through increased 
12 
military-to-military engagements. China’s military progress is being demonstrated by 
peacekeeping operations and naval movements to forward areas-including Latin 
America. However, as Chinese deployments become more commonplace to areas 
like Latin America it is currently not a strategic threat. 
 Though the United States remains the dominant player in Central and South 
America, its economic and political influence appears to be declining. The constraint of 
the U.S. budget due to the 2008 recession has encouraged Latin American countries to 
increase their engagement with the PRC, which has provided and air of optimism with 
their promises of infrastructure improvements and economic partnerships. As Latin 
American countries grow economically through trade with China, it can be expected that 
they will continue to distance themselves from the influence of Washington. 
Strategically, U.S. military commitment to Latin America is relatively weak compared to 
the other Combatant Commands. United States foreign policy is continually dictated by 
the threat posed by the threat of terrorism emanating from the Middle East. With the 
United States continuing to combat terrorism as part of the Global War on Terror, the 
lack of threat posed by terrorists in Latin America is also contributing to the seeming 
decline of interest in the region. The war on drugs that the United States and Latin 
American countries have actively participated in may be losing partner country 
commitments, due in part to Washington’s inconsistent drug policy with the legalization 
of marijuana in Washington and Colorado, as well as the recent legalization of marijuana 
in Uruguay. 
Alternatively, the United States’ interest in the region may only seem to be in 
decline because of the arrival of China in the region. The China-Latin American 
relationship is relatively new and the rate of investment has been initially high. Latin 
American countries are uneasy about how long the commodity investment will continue 
and would like to “broaden the range of commercial ties beyond commodities.”38 Even 
with new policies in place to strengthen political ties, without a broadened base 
of economic venture, there is a possibility that the relationship could end, especially if 
38 Ferchen, “Comparing China’s and Japan’s Latin American Policy.” 
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the Chinese market unexpectedly collapses or access to resources in Latin America 
become unattainable.  
D. RESEARCH DESIGN AND THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis is a comparative analysis between the relationships of the PRC with 
Latin America and the United States’ relationship with Latin America. In the comparative 
analysis between the United States and China in Latin America, I will focus on the 
themes of economics, foreign relations, and military cooperation. The resources used in 
the literature review have been expanded on in the thesis vis-a-vis government documents 
concerning policy, Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of the Navy (DON) 
documents concerning the shift to the Pacific, and academic literature. Statistical 
economic data was procured through databases, including the World Bank, World Trade 
Organization, and the CIA Factbook. Ultimately, this thesis concludes with foreign policy 
recommendations for the United States concerning their involvement in Latin America, 
especially the need for the United States to maintain relationships with countries 
throughout Latin America.  
The proceeding chapters are organized in a way to allow the reader to easily 
follow the comparative analysis between U.S. and Chinese relations throughout Latin 
America. Chapter II discusses the People’s Republic of China and its relationship with 
Latin America. Chapter III concentrates on the United States’ relationship with Latin 
America. Chapter IV concludes the thesis, recommends policy considerations, and areas 
of further research. 
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II. CHINA’S RELATIONSHIP WITH LATIN AMERICA 
The relationship between China and Latin America is not a new phenomenon; it 
has developed slowly, in what many authors have dubbed a period of accumulation.39 
Since 1949, this relationship has consisted of people-to-people exchanges that have 
grown into the economic partnership that one observes presently. Former Chinese 
Premier Zhou Enlai set the impetus for their seemingly inevitable partnership by stating, 
“China and Latin American nations should ‘develop people-to-people exchanges, strive 
to establish friendly relations and to develop the cultural and economic intercourse, and 
gradually move toward the establishment of diplomatic relations.’”40 This chapter will 
describe the economic partnership, foreign policy, and military-to-military cooperation 
between the People’s Republic of China and the countries of Latin America. 
A. CHINESE–LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMICS 
This section on Sino-Latin American economics will concentrate exclusively on 
the development of the economic relationship between the People’s Republic of China 
and Latin America. Under current conditions, both China and countries throughout Latin 
America stand to benefit. China requires large amounts of natural resources and seeks 
trading partnerships and investment opportunities, while many Latin American countries 
are gaining increased economic growth as well as critical enhancement of infrastructure 
projects from Chinese firms. Many academics and politicians claim that China is filling a 
gap left by an inattentive United States. Nevertheless, the increased Chinese presence in 
Latin America are not necessarily correlated to United States policies for the continent. 
Instead, China seems to be taking advantage of economic opportunity in the Western 
Hemisphere, much like they have done in Africa and certain countries in Southeast Asia, 
independently of American diplomatic priorities. Moreover, some Latin American 
countries see China as an economic role model considering its economic growth. If Latin 
American countries could duplicate that success it could provide a greater opportunity to 
                                                 
39 Zheng, “The Present Situation and Prospects of China-Latin American Relations,” 1. 
40 Ibid., 1–2. 
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separate from the influence of U.S. regional power. The following sub-sections will focus 
on economic factors that have driven the Sino-Latin American relationship, the Chinese 
aspect of this relationship, and the Latin American perspective. 
1. China’s Economic Growth 
Economically, China has gone global, exchanging their communist model for a 
capitalist one. Since 1978, China has been slowly opening its economy.41 Converting the 
economic system was a lengthy process; reformers pressed on with the changes and 
understood that the process would take time, as the Chinese had to learn the new system 
while simultaneously preserving the economy they continued to maintain. This model of 
transition is known as a dual-track system and supporters argue that, “markets are 
fundamentally political, social, and cultural systems, and a stable transition to a capitalist 
system must occur in a gradual fashion, with significant and constant support and 
guidance from the state.”42 This dual-track system worked because, “on one track, 
economic agents assigned rights to, and obligations for, fixed quantities of goods at fixed 
planned prices as specified in the preexisting plan. At the same time, a market track is 
introduced under which economic agents participate in the market at free market prices, 
provided that they fulfill their obligations under the preexisting plan.”43 This plan 
incentivized the labor to produce more than the state needed under the pre-existing 
planned market. With the excess production, they created their own market that began to 
grow, while the state’s overall economy was able to maintain the status quo. The success 
in changing China’s economy to a more market based system is shown by the growth rate 
in Gross National Product (GNP) at an average of 10 percent per year, from 1978 to 
                                                 
41 Barry Naughton, The Chinese Economy: Transitions and Growth, (Cambridge, MA: The MIT 
Press, 2007), 85. 
42 Doug Guthrie, “China and Globalization,” in The Political Economy Reader: Markets and 
Institutions, ed. Naazneen H. Barma and Steven K. Vogel (New York: Routledge, 2008), 399. 
43 Yingyi Qian, “How Reform Worked in China,” in In Search of Prosperity: Analytical Narratives on 
Economic Growth, ed. Dani Rodrik (Princeton University Press, 2003), 307. 
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2009.44 The growing market economy has introduced a middle class and brought about 
industrial growth, previously unknown under the planned economy.45  
The literature has increasingly focused on the growth in trade between China and 
Brazil, spurred by the larger pattern of trade between Brazil, Russia, India, and China (the 
BRIC countries). This term was coined by Jim O’Neill of Goldman Sachs, and this 
grouping is significant because of the growth of these countries’ markets and the 
expectation for them to anchor the global economy. South Africa joined the grouping in 
2010, and these five countries are specifically noted for their increasing global 
prominence: “BRICS comprise those emerging powers whose rapidly growing 
economies, substantial populations, military capabilities, and expanding diplomatic reach 
translate into rising power profiles.”46 This trade relationship is referred to as a South-
South relationship, because China has grown its networks extensively in developing 
countries of the Southern Hemisphere.47 Trade, foreign direct investment (FDI), and 
monetary aid are a few economic factors one can use to gauge the impact China is having 
in Latin America.  
2. China’s Economic Interest in Latin America 
Neither China nor Southeast Asia has the necessary resources to sustain the 
growth of the Chinese economy, which is why China has had to expand globally.48 China 
began a “going out” campaign in 2000, as its companies expanded to overseas markets to 
gain a competitive edge, buy brands, or gain more access to natural resources.49 The 
opening of the Chinese market in the 1990s allowed for an influx of primary products 
imported from Latin America.  
                                                 
44 R. Evan Ellis, China in Latin America: The Whats and Wherefores, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2009), 9. 
45 Ibid., 9–10. 
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47 Laidler, “South-South Special,” 3. 
48 Ibid., 10. 
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The rapid growth of Latin American exports to China from the end of the 
1990s was a result of the increased reliance of China on imports of key 
raw materials to fuel its industrial boom and to meet the changing food 
consumption patterns that accompanied higher income levels. This is 
reflected in the composition of the region’s exports to China, a large and 
increasing proportion of which comprise unprocessed primary products 
such as copper, iron ore, crude oil and soybeans.50 
China’s demand for resources is best seen in its use of energy: with the largest 
population in the world, it can be expected that China utilizes a large share of oil.51 With 
a population of over 1.3 billion, China utilizes “10% of global oil consumption and has to 
import over 50% of its oil needs, so state-owned oil companies have been acquiring 
stakes in oil fields around the world.”52 Because its consumption alone exceeds 
production capability, it is necessary for it to rely on sources of fuel abroad to meet its 
domestic needs. As aforementioned, China’s reliance on Latin American countries for 
raw materials does not appear to show signs of tapering off. Chinese researchers at the 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences expect trade between the PRC and Latin America to 
grow at a rate of eight percent annually through 2020.53 Given these extensive needs, 
Latin American countries as well as other resource rich areas can most likely count on 
continued Chinese investment. Figure 1 illustrates the increase in trade from 2005 
through 2014. Imports from China have increased from $36 billion in 2005 to almost 
$180 billion in 2014, a growth rate of 393 percent over 10 years.54 Exports to China have 
also increased over the same period, from $19 billion to $98 billion-a 412 percent growth 
rate.55 This data was collated from Market Analysis and Research, International Trade 
Centre and is based on total trade in goods. The graph below the blue bar represents 
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imports from China to Latin America and the red bar is exports to China from Latin 
America. 
 
Figure 1.  Latin American Imports and Exports with China56 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) from China to Latin America is growing. Despite 
having the second largest economy in the world beginning in 2013, China’s outward FDI 
did not match its global economic position, investing just 6.05 percent of total global FDI 
and that mostly in emerging markets.57 According to the Ministry of Commerce of China 
12.45 percent of China’s 2009 FDI went to Latin America, and concentrated mostly in 
                                                 
56 “Bilateral trade between Latin America and the Caribbean and China Product: TOTAL All products 
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2015, http://www.trademap.org/Bilateral_TS.aspx; “Bilateral trade between Latin America and the 
Caribbean and China Product: TOTAL All products (Exports),” Trade Map, Market Analysis and 
Research, International Trade Centre, Accessed June 18, 2015, 
http://www.trademap.org/Bilateral_TS.aspx. 
57 Laidler, “South-South Special,” 9. 
 20 
resource extraction and manufacturing sectors.58 One constraint that could limit China’s 
future growth comes from the trend of resource nationalism in countries such as Brazil, 
Argentina, and Uruguay.59 To prevent large swaths of land purchasing that was 
consistent from Chinese companies in 2010, restrictions were imposed that did not 
prevent investment, “but did force Chinese investors to enter contract farming 
partnerships, rather than outright land ownership.”60 Although minerals and metals rank 
highly among Chinese investors, China can seek other opportunities for investment. 
Referenced as the “farm of the world,” Latin America provides key commodities in 
agriculture as well.61 According to the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), 
“China’s 1.3bn population consumes [20%] of the global food supply, yet has only about 
9% of the world’s acreage under production. In the last 15 years, China’s imports of key 
commodities (corn, soybean and wheat) have increased from 2% of consumption to as 
high as 20% in 2013/14.”62 Mainland Central and South America are not the only ones 
benefitting from the relationship as China looked into the Caribbean for new economic 
ties and joined the Caribbean Development bank in 1998.63 Overall, “from 1993 to 2000, 
China-Latin America total trade volume doubled the accumulative volume from 1978 to 
1992, reaching 58.5 billion U.S. dollars.”64 During this timeframe, an economic deal with 
China usually came with recognition of the PRC over the ROC (Taiwan). 
3. Latin America Looks East 
Since the 1980s, Latin America has increasingly felt the loss of foreign direct 
investment as funds from the West declined.65 This lack of FDI was most evident in 
2003, the year with the lowest amount of investment of $36 billion since investors started 
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to shift to Asia in the 1980s.66 However, this trend began to change in 2004 when 
President Hu Jintao of China visited five countries on his Latin American tour, promising 
“$100 billion…over the next 10 years.”67 The United Nations (UN) Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) references the diminishing 
relative presence of the United States in Latin America by stating the increasing 
engagement presented by the PRC: “Asia, led by China, has considerably increased its 
share of the region’s trade flows.”68 The following chapter will discuss overall trade and 
investment in terms of U.S. dollar amounts that are declining while China’s trade and 
investment are rising. The lack of U.S. investment in Latin America has led to a warm 
reception of President Hu’s promises, “including an array of potential, multibillion-dollar 
projects for specific countries, generated hope that China could step into the role of Latin 
America’s benefactor and driver of development, which the West had seemingly 
abdicated.”69 This void can likely be traced to condition of the U.S. economy since the 
beginning of the 2008 recession. Many of the pledges were in areas where the region 
needs most attention. Projects such as “railway, oil exploration, and construction projects 
in Argentina; a nickel plant in Cuba; copper mining projects in Chile; and a steel mill, 
railway, and oil exploration projects in Brazil” are all welcome advances.70 Many of the 
infrastructure projects that have been completed are centered on access to commodities, 
like increasing the capabilities of port facilities. This aspect of infrastructure development 
is described in the U.S.-China Economic and Security Commission, “China focuses its 
assistance on its own strategic objectives and economic needs, such as developing 
infrastructure such as ports used to haul oil and other commodities back to China; 
expanding access to oil, gas, and other natural resources needed for China’s development; 
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and increasing market access for Chinese products.”71 In fact, the lack of infrastructure is 
a problem faced by the Brazilians and the Chinese in importing and exporting products 
for each other’s markets.72 A solution to this problem is critical for productive trade 
between China and Brazil to continue.73 Therefore, the Chinese have begun exploring 
options to increase rail and road routes through the Andes to Pacific ports in order to 
expedite the process: however, the majority of projects that are considered for 
infrastructure developments have yet to make it past the promise and planning process. 
Although the infrastructure projects are seemingly welcomed by most host nations, 
current obstacles such as protected lands and indigenous rights prevent the process from 
starting. “Perhaps the most ambitious project currently under discussion is a proposed 
inter-oceanic corridor from the Brazilian port city of Manaus to the Ecuadorian port city 
of Manta.”74 A project that expansive could bring many jobs to Brazil (if China does not 
bring their own workforce and construction equipment). Nonetheless, it is still reported as 
being in the planning stages of development.75 
Furthermore, the imposition of the Washington Consensus into Latin American 
affairs has led to dissatisfaction with the United States and its policies. The failed 
Washington Consensus, a set of ten neo-liberal policies to foster macroeconomic stability 
and international growth, has led to Latin American countries aspiring to follow in the 
footsteps of the PRC.76 To some, the policies of the Washington Consensus, “failed to 
address—and, in the eyes of some, may have deepened—Latin America’s deep-rooted 
problems of inequality, corruption, and stagnant growth.”77 The new approach, coined as 
the Beijing consensus, refers to the economic growth of China over the past thirty years. 
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China was once poorer than some states in Latin America, and it is now the second 
largest economy in the world. Its approach decreased poverty throughout the PRC and 
maintained the strength of state control in economic sectors: “whatever the lessons of the 
Chinese experience that can be applied realistically in Latin America, the ‘Chinese 
model’ is a convenient rhetorical tool for regimes in search of development, but who do 
not want to follow a path of transparency, accountability, and institutional reforms that 
could result in the ouster of the existing leadership.”78  
The trade alliances between the PRC and the countries of Latin America have 
steadily grown since China began opening its economy. Today we observe China 
supplanting the United States as the primary economic partner in many Latin American 
countries. The opportunity for enhanced infrastructure projects, a strong economic 
growth rate, and steady buyer of Latin American goods natural resources have ensured a 
stronger bond. Chinese researchers at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences have 
declared this relationship will continue to grow as China’s need for resources, which is 
driven by its growth, remains constant. 
B. CHINESE–LATIN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
The growing economic relationship between China and Latin American countries 
has resulted in increased trust and influence. This shown by the inclusion of China as an 
observer of the Organization for American States (OAS) since 2004. In 2008, China 
released a policy statement affirming the value they placed on growing their relationships 
with the countries of Latin America: “‘the Chinese government regards China-Latin 
America relations from a strategic perspective, and devotes itself to establishing and 
developing comprehensive cooperation partnerships of equality and mutual benefit and 
the collaborative development with Latin American and Caribbean nations.’”79 
Economic partnerships in the region have led to greater diplomatic ties with the PRC, 
thus increasing political and social integration with Latin Americans. This section will 
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examine Latin America’s willingness to cooperate through the inclusion of China in 
regional organizations, diplomatic recognition, and cultural studies. 
Simultaneously, the growth of economic partnerships throughout Latin America 
has led to increased political interaction with the PRC. China’s policy paper 
acknowledges the growing exchanges with governments and regional organizations in 
Latin America and the Caribbean publicizing that “China will continue this pattern of 
engagement in regional and sub-regional organizations as a means for promoting 
‘regional solidarity, development and integration.’”80 That pattern of engagement has 
been seen in the inclusion of China as a permanent observer to the OAS, the Latin 
American Parliament, and has participated with the Community of Latin America and 
Caribbean States (CELAC). During President Jinping’s 2014 visit, the Chinese delegation 
met with leaders of CELAC— “a forum organized to unite countries of the hemisphere 
that currently excludes the United States and Canada.”81 This integration shows a 
possible bias by Latin American leaders who may appreciate a partner outside of the 
hemisphere, considering the United States and Canada are left out of this organization. 
The PRC is starting a new initiative to gain closer ties with the organization by, “the 
building of a new ‘China-CELAC Forum’ … an effort to build a regional Latin American 
body to engage with China in a way that is similar to the Forum on China-Africa 
Cooperation (FOCAC).”82 The Chinese have either opened dialogue or sought to deepen 
relationships throughout Latin America by initiating bilateral or grouped forums since 
2005.83  
However, the influential rise of China has not come without obstacles. One hurdle 
China and Latin American countries have overcome, in some circumstances, surrounds 
the recognition of Taiwan. Previous to 2008, the PRC would not enter into a cooperative 
relationship with any country that recognized Taiwan’s sovereignty under the One-China 
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policy.84 This policy states that, “a nation-state cannot recognize both the PRC and the 
Republic of China.”85 As a result, between 2000 and 2008, “eight nations have switched 
recognition from Taiwan to China. Taiwan now has just 24 diplomatic allies around the 
world, mostly small countries in the Caribbean, Africa and the Pacific, along with seven 
others in Latin America.”86 This is a reduction of 64 percent since the 1960s. Perhaps 
countries hoping to benefit from Chinese economic growth would have missed the 
opportunity without the diplomatic switch. Even though Taiwan has been a regular 
economic partner with many countries throughout Latin America, they cannot compete 
with the amount of money China is willing to spend in the region; Taiwan “is now hard-
pressed to compete against the growing economic and political clout of China—what one 
official in Taiwan referred to as China’s ‘dollar diplomacy.’”87 Costa Rica changed their 
diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to the PRC in 2007 and in return China built a new 
soccer stadium for the country.88 This is not the first example of the quid pro quo used by 
the PRC: “This is a major driver of Chinese aid to countries in the region, particularly in 
Central America and the Caribbean. When China provided aid to build cricket stadiums 
in several Caribbean countries in the run-up to the 2007 World Cup, both Dominica and 
Grenada switched recognition from Taiwan to the PRC.”89 China sought to increase its 
claim over Taiwan through offering benefits such as building sports arenas and other 
economic incentives. Figure 2 illustrates the remaining countries of Latin America that 
continue to recognize the ROC. However, in 2008, “the PRC and Taiwan agreed to a 
‘diplomatic truce.’”90 The issue of diplomatic recognition in order to cooperate with 
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either is currently not a stipulation for partnership. This truce has been signed into 
agreement through the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA). This 
legislation states that “the PRC and Taiwan would cease in their attempts to accumulate 
each other’s diplomatic allies and in turn, both would maintain the status quo.”91 
Nonetheless, China continues to institute programs and incentives to create a positive 
impression amongst countries in Latin America. 
 
Figure 2.  Countries that Diplomatically Recognize Taiwan in Latin America92 
Another way in which the PRC looks to garner continued support is through 
social outreach programs, like those provided at Confucius Institutes. These institutes are 
a, “global effort to attain ‘soft power’ matching its growing economic and military 
prowess.”93 Latin America’s first Confucius Institute was built in Mexico City in 2006, 
by the end of 2008 that number rose to 17 throughout the region.94 As of 2015, The 
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University of Nebraska-Lincoln Confucius Institute website lists 30 Institutes spanning 
Central and South America as well as the Caribbean; the United States hosts 96 of these 
Institutes (none of the Confucius Institutes are located in countries that recognize 
Taiwan).95 Confucius Institutes are located mostly at foreign universities and 
international media venues.96 The institutes help spread a cultural and linguistic 
understanding of China, advance media outlets, and empower Chinese communities 
abroad. It is important to recognize that, “they do not compete with university programs, 
but augment existing language courses and cultural exchange efforts. Confucius Institutes 
also support primary and secondary school Chinese language classes.”97 They also 
promote personnel exchanges, so students can immerse themselves both in the Chinese 
language and Chinese culture, and then return home to teach.98 Exchanges like these may 
help to ensure future cooperation between China and Latin America. 
The growing economic relationship between China and Latin American countries 
has resulted in increased trust and influence among these partners. China’s policy 
statement affirming the value they place on growing their relationships with the countries 
of Latin America has been reciprocated throughout the region. The economic 
partnerships have led to greater diplomatic ties with the PRC, and this bond may continue 
to increase political and social integration with Latin Americans. 
C. MILITARY COOPERATION 
Another important aspect of China’s relationship with Latin America is the use of 
the military as an instrument in expanding their presence in the region. China has been 
cautious in deploying assets to the western hemisphere in an effort to prevent aggravating 
Washington. Furthermore, the Chinese do not currently possess the long-range, long-term 
logistical capability of the United States, making their current military growth and 
involvement in military affairs through Latin America a benign threat to U.S. interests. 
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As China’s military capability grows, the aptitude to deploy around the world and for 
longer periods will likely follow. Just as the economic and foreign policy dynamics have 
encouraged further involvement between the PRC and countries of Latin America, the 
same can be said of their military-to-military cooperation. Militaries throughout the 
region are diversifying their cooperation with allies; this includes receiving professional 
military education, tactical training, arms, and equipment from the People’s Liberation 
Army (PLA) and other Chinese military contractors.99 This section will discuss Chinese 
deployments to Latin America, peer-to-peer exchanges, and arms sales. 
Military relations in Sino-Latin America partnerships have received less attention 
in the literature, but there are still examples of the PRC’s attempts to enhance this 
relationship. In the Western Hemisphere, China has contributed to small-scale operations, 
such as MINUSTAH, the Haitian peacekeeping effort, since 2004.100 China’s 
participation in this mission is significant as Haiti recognizes Taiwan, but this 
demonstrates China’s willingness to cooperate with countries that do not entirely serve 
their interests.101 Other deployments to the region include:  
bilateral humanitarian engagements such as the November 2010 Angel de 
Paz medical exercise in Peru and the December 2011 trip by the Chinese 
medical ship “Peace Ark” to the Caribbean, to more combat-oriented 
engagements, such as the joint training activities conducted with Chilean 
and Brazilian naval forces during the visit by a PLA naval flotilla to the 
Southern Cone in November 2013.102  
Since then, the PRC has steadily increased participation of military exercises in 
the hemisphere. The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) recently participated in the 
annual Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) 2014 exercise, a multinational naval effort 
coordinated by the United States. The United States lifted the ban on Chinese 
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participation in 2012 and invited the PLAN back for future exercises.103 This gesture 
displays U.S. willingness to work with the PRC and cooperate with the growth of the 
People’s Liberation Army Navy. Meanwhile, Latin America has increased their military 
cooperation with the Chinese as well, citing the “longstanding proclamations of 
nonintervention and respect for state sovereignty,” that the Chinese maintain in their 
military doctrine.104 The PLA and the PLAN can gain valuable experience by 
participating, with the United States Navy in exercises as well as operating with U.S. 
allies. As China’s navy is really beginning to take shape the use of port visits and training 
exercises with U.S. allied maritime partners in Central and South America allow the 
PLAN to learn how the United States Navy operates—a lesson in sea power. As R. Evan 
Ellis states, “Chinese partnerships with militaries that previously had a close relationship 
with the United States, including not only Venezuela, but also, for example, Chile, afford 
the Chinese opportunities to learn U.S. doctrine, tactics and standard operating 
procedures.”105 However, the application of training received vis-à-vis observation and 
light participation with the United States or allied countries is a tool for growth but 
unlikely to be successful offensive tool if conflict were to occur. Much of U.S. doctrine 
and military publications are available in open sources and offer the opportunity for one 
to advance their own military training. Even with the availability of this knowledge, the 
ability to apply it is different from reading about it or participating in a multilateral 
exercise. China has a lot to learn on how to use their military as a form of statecraft like 
the United States. As the PRC’s military expands operations globally they will tread 
lightly so as not to complicate what fragile relationship they do have with the United 
States.106 
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Just as the Confucius Institutes have led to civilian peer-to-peer exchanges, the 
military is conducting the same practice in professional exchanges. In China’s policy 
paper on relations with Latin America, published in 2008, it “announced that it sought to 
enhance ‘mutual visits by defense and military officials of the two sides as well as 
personnel exchanges,’ and to deepen ‘professional exchanges in military training, 
personnel training and peacekeeping.’”107 This is demonstrated by China “inviting Latin 
American foreign officers to attend the Chinese National Defense University [opening] a 
path toward aligning the militaries of these states to Beijing. These invitations are 
intended to give foreign officers a much deeper empathy to China’s positions.”108 
Furthermore, the PRC stands to gain an understanding of professional military education 
offered in the United States vis-à-vis Latin American military officers who have 
previously attended U.S. institutions, but it also affords the People’s Liberation Army the 
opportunity to develop future Latin American leaders.109 The PLA is offering training at 
all levels of the officer corps in programs ranging from engineering to grand strategy: 
“for instance, at the PLA Navy Staff College, it is not uncommon to have Latin American 
junior and senior officers attending different levels of education in the same year. This 
allows the Chinese military to get acquainted with officers from different generations and 
from all services.”110 Coursework is available for Latin American personnel at a number 
of PLA institutes, including the Defense Studies Institute, Army Command College, 
Chinese Navy Command School, Center for Military Instruction, and Naval Research 
Institute. Latin American military personnel have been hosted at these establishments for 
training periods as few as three months and as long as one year.111 Although exact 
numbers of participants being exchanged in either direction have not been accessible, the 
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opportunity for military professionals from China and countries of Latin America work 
toward the ultimate goal of building stronger partnerships. 
Another opportunity for Latin American countries to take advantage of is the sale 
of arms from China. The PRC has already offered military assistance in the training and 
equipping militaries throughout the region. What may be disheartening for Washington is 
the amount of support China offers to Venezuela and Cuba. An example of this support 
occurred in 2004 when, “China sold 3 JYL-1 Mobile Air Defense Radars to Venezuela, 
and offered to sell FC-1 and J-10 fighter aircraft.”112 When Hugo Chavez removed U.S. 
Special Operations units out of Venezuela in 2002, he invited PLA units to fill the void 
left by the end of U.S. military aid.113 The training of military forces was also observed 
in Cuba: “China has actively supported Cuba’s Air and Air Defense Forces (DAAFAR) 
in the development of sophisticated radar, early-detection, and [anti-aircraft] systems.”114 
In exchange for their received training, Cuba opened the Lourdes facility, a signals 
intelligence operation built by the Soviet Union, to collect intelligence off the U.S. 
coast.115 
However good intentioned, this growing aspect of China’s use of the military as 
an instrument to expand its presence, influence, and tactical knowledge vis-a-vis U.S. 
allies and military exercises should be concerning to U.S. leadership. China has been 
cautious in deploying assets to the western hemisphere in an effort to prevent aggravating 
Washington, but military-to-military cooperation continues to grow. Even though the 
Chinese do not currently possess the long-range, long-term logistical capability, like that 
of the United States, they are making headway with their current military growth and 
involvement in military affairs. 
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D. CONCLUSION 
China’s economic relationship with Latin America is mutually beneficial and 
strategically offers China opportunities to grow militarily. As China continues to grow as 
a global power, its need for primary products is satisfied by the cooperation of resource 
rich countries throughout Latin America. Furthermore, its cash reserves for investment, 
offer countries in Latin America a partner outside of the United States and an opportunity 
to grow economically. One can observe the history of economic influence to affect 
diplomacy, as recognition of the ROC has declined in a region that historically leant 
toward Taipei. The way in which China has achieved their economic success serves as a 
role model for Latin American countries who have found the Washington Consensus and 
other U.S. initiatives lacking. The PRC’s foreign policy agenda offers a fresh wave of 
support, especially in an era when the United States foreign policy agenda is highlighted 
by a tightened budget, turmoil in the Middle East, and an emphasis on growing Pacific 
partnerships. Continued visits to Latin America by high-level dignitaries exemplify the 
importance of the relationship to China, which is reinforced by its 2008 policy paper, 
Confucius Institutes, and peer exchanges. Overall, the Chinese presence is growing, 
affectively filling a void that the United States has been unable to fill economically and 
strategically. Continued cooperation between the PLA and PLAN with Latin American 
allies begins to make up for a lack of military assets from the United States, which has 
not put as much emphasis into the region since the beginning of the Global War on 
Terror. The arrival and consistent presence of the PLA and PLAN in the Western 
Hemisphere is not seen as a strategic threat to the United States. Currently it stands as a 
lesson in forward presence operations as the Chinese military, especially their Navy, 
begins to take shape in operations away from homeland defense. The current dynamics of 
the Sino-Latin American relationships suggest that continued economic growth will 
continue to encourage trade partnerships between the PRC and Latin American countries. 
As the PLA(N) continues to expand operations abroad the strategic value of alliances in 
the Western Hemisphere could continue to drive ties with Latin American countries, even 
if economic conditions begin to decline. 
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III. UNITED STATES’ RELATIONSHIP WITH LATIN AMERICA 
Much of the literature suggests that the United States is less engaged from issues 
facing Latin America, especially those related to economics, foreign policy, and military 
cooperation. Because of geographical location, one would assume that the relationship 
between Washington and Latin American countries would be beneficial for that region; 
however, differences in political standing, failed economic reforms, and a feeling of 
dominance from North America has left some relationships estranged. This chapter will 
analyze the economic partnership, foreign policy, and military-to-military cooperation 
between the United States and the countries of Latin America. 
A. U.S.–LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMICS 
During the early 1990s, the United States made many attempts to foster beneficial 
relationships with the countries in Latin America. These efforts began in 1989 with the 
Brady Debt Relief Act and led to the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA).116 Furthermore, the United States played host to the Summit of the Americas 
and created a rescue package that prevented Mexico’s economy from failing.117 NAFTA 
has been a successful endeavor for those involved, which led to the attempted formation 
of a Free Trade Area of the America’s (FTAA), and was announced during the Summit of 
the Americas. The effort failed to come to fruition, but Washington has been successful 
in garnering a web of bilateral trade agreements, even though some aspects of those pacts 
are seen as unfair by participating Latin American countries:  
Still, they resent Washington’s unwillingness to compromise on most 
issues, such as the trade distorting support payments the U.S. government 
makes to U.S. farmers, harsh U.S. antidumping rules, and Washington’s 
demands for new standards of intellectual property protection. Sky-high 
tariffs and quota limitations on sugar, orange juice, cotton, and many other 
high-volume Latin American exports make the United States seem 
ungenerous.118  
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These examples are but a few of the reasons why the United States has been 
supplanted by China in some Latin American countries, as China became “the number 
one trade partner for Chile and Brazil and ranks in the top five for Peru, Argentina, and 
Venezuela—allowing all of these countries to diversify their exports away from the 
United States and thus lessening the sway of the U.S. market.”119 Although the United 
States is still the leading trading partner for the Latin American region as a whole: “U.S. 
exports to the region [are] valued at more than $150 billion a year, almost as much as the 
value of its exports to the European Union. But two-thirds of that goes to Mexico, while 
Brazil and other South American markets remain relatively untapped in the absence of 
more productive hemispheric trade arrangements.”120 This section will concentrate on 
trade between the United States and Latin America, the present Latin American 
perspective on the trade, and why Mexico continues to align with North America. 
1. U.S. Trade with Latin America 
One of the debates before academics and politicians is whether China is filling an 
economic void left by the United States as it concentrates on areas away from the 
Western Hemisphere. Washington has been seeking stability in the Middle East and 
pivoting to the Pacific—concentrating on security and economic partnerships. Latin 
America has felt the loss of investment. Monetary trade in goods has increased by just 
over seven percent from 2001 to 2010, but the amount of goods from the United States to 
Latin America declined by 8.6 percent, along with goods from Latin America to the U.S. 
declining by approximately 16 percent during the same period.121 In addition to this 
decline in overall goods, the U.S. trade deficit with the region has increased by $25 
billion.122 This reduction of the United States as a trade partner is due in part to the 
increase in trade from China; reduced budgetary resources since the 2008 recession; 
opposition from the left leaning governments of Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador; and 
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the high economic tariffs imposed by the United States.123 The decline in participation 
restrains some economic growth between the United States and the region. The current 
period of peaceful coexistence, highlighted by the recent relaxing of sanctions against 
Cuba, may prove to be a time for greater economic cooperation. Figure 3 illustrates the 
amount of trade from 2005 through 2014 between Latin America and the United States. 
Imports from the United States have increased from $187 billion in 2005 to almost $356 
billion in 2014, a growth rate of 90 percent over 10 years.124 Exports to the United States 
have also increased over the same period, from $284 billion to $455 billion-a 60 percent 
growth rate.125 This data was collated from Market Analysis and Research, International 
Trade Centre and is based on total trade in goods. Even though the data supports 
increased monetary trade between the United States and Latin America, the growth rates 
are much lower than those with China. This section will analyze the prospects for future 
economic cooperation in light of China’s presence in the region and existing free trade 
agreements. 
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Figure 3.  Latin American Imports and Exports with the United States126 
The United States and Latin America have a steady history starting around the 
time of the colonial expansion of Western Europe to the Americas. Nonetheless, the 
United States and the countries of Latin America could not be farther separated by what 
each needs. Washington’s agenda does not encompass what Latin America seems to 
need: “reduced agricultural subsidies, more liberal immigration laws, greater social 
investment and bigger development projects.”127 In turn, Latin American governments 
have not rallied to what Washington seeks: “reliable partners in the war on 
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terrorism…and more open markets for trade and foreign investment.”128 Some of these 
incompatible needs continue to block the development of the FTAA. Whereas the success 
garnered through NAFTA and multiple free trade agreements has been beneficial to those 
countries that participate, it could be argued that the Free Trade Agreement of the 
Americas would be of greater benefit for the entire Western Hemisphere, bringing North 
and South America to a more fruitful relationship. Even though the initiative was stopped 
in the U.S. Congress, which is but one reason that it did not materialize, the opportunity 
for that legislation to re-emerge is diminishing because the United States’ declining 
importance as a trading partner with countries in Latin America. For instance, the trade 
bloc Mercosur, led by Brazil, prefers strengthening the ties within MERCOSUR, other 
established trading blocs, the European Union (EU), and China.129 This opposing 
approach to bilateral free trade agreement with the United States and clashes with the 
United States over protected industry, copyright, and tariffs continue to threaten any 
attempt at creating the FTAA. Arguably, until Washington abolishes its policies on 
domestic agricultural subsidies, it is likely the members of Mercosur will not approve any 
bilateral trade agreement or any future FTAA initiative.130  
The United States is standing in its own way in reaching two of the largest 
markets in Latin America because of its tariffs, leaving the market open for China, the 
EU, and its own inter-bloc trade.131 Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, and 
Venezuela make up the trade bloc of Mercosur; the first and third largest economies of 
Latin America, Brazil and Argentina, are responsible for 65 percent of South America’s 
GDP.132 Furthermore, the left leaning countries of Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador are 
some of the most active anti-U.S. governments in the Western Hemisphere and are also 
members of the Bolivarian Alternative to the Americas (ALBA): “which is an 
organization that has the explicit goal of opposing the Free Trade Area of the 
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Americas.”133 Despite a number of indicators that Latin American countries do not trust 
or seek to cooperate with the United States, there is still an opportunity to work toward a 
better relationship if Washington is willing. Jose Fernandez argues that our strongest 
allies in Latin America are Mexico, Brazil, and Colombia, three of the four strongest 
economies in the region, and must prioritize our economic efforts there to exemplify our 
commitment and the positive affect of U.S. trade.134 
An eroding U.S. economic presence can likely be attributed to a reduced budget, 
U.S. concentration on trade with Mexico, as well as growing involvement of the PRC in 
Latin America. Because of this missing presence, exports to China grew at a rate of over 
32 percent from 2001 to 2010, mostly in primary goods, and helped the economies of 
several Latin American countries recover from recession.135 These aspects of trade with 
China are further compounded by the consistent 10 percent growth rate of the Chinese 
economy through 2015, while the U.S. rate of growth is nearly half that—encouraging a 
heavier emphasis on China as a trading partner.136 However, the United States is a major 
importer of high-income goods; most of which are produced in Mexico’s manufacturing 
sector—which uses imported goods to assemble high-income products bound for the 
United States.137 Mexico remains the primary exporter to the U.S. from Latin America 
because, “of the country’s abundant cheap labor, proximity to U.S. markets, and the legal 
structure provided by the North American Free Trade Agreement.”138 This has led the 
rest of Latin America to seek a competitive and reliable trade partners outside of the 
Western Hemisphere. 
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2. The Latin American Perspective 
U.S. intervention, failed economic reform by way of the Washington Consensus, 
high tariffs, and extreme protectionist measures have created an atmosphere of distrust in 
Latin America. Countries throughout the region were quick to implement the reform 
measures, in the early 1990s, recommended by the Washington Consensus, after the 
failure of Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI); those measures include fiscal 
restraint, an increase in the role of the private sector while reducing the states’ role in 
economic control, and reevaluation of trade policies that concentrate on the international 
market.139 The reformist measures of the Washington Consensus failed, “the Latin 
American economies have experienced their worst quarter century” under the 
Washington Consensus.140 The negative results felt throughout Latin America arguably 
weakened the fragile democracies that were newly in place after years of authoritarian 
rule, and though they did not fall, their ability to provide goods and services 
deteriorated.141 After the disappointment of this program, one can expect countries to 
seek a model for success from a different partner who may possess greater understanding 
of the region or come from a similar situation. Latin America has worked to develop 
lucrative trade agreements with China, the European Union, and other international 
partners. Currently, Latin American economies have grown out of deep debt and 
improved their global economic standing: 
Many LAC [Latin American and Caribbean] countries have moved 
beyond their traditional reliance on resources from the International 
Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development 
Bank. Chile, Mexico, Peru, and Brazil now enjoy investment-grade status 
from credit-rating agencies and in recent years have been able to raise 
capital readily in international markets.142 
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As economies recover from global market crashes, trade is beginning to increase. Even 
though the relationship between Latin America and the United States has been strained, 
the opportunity for further economic partnerships can evolve. The strongest trading 
relationship is seen between the United States and Mexico, where the bulk of goods are 
manufactured before heading to the U.S. market.  
However, south of Mexico, U.S. reach is limited as there are a number of markets 
that remain untapped due to extreme protectionist measures. Moreover, two influential 
factors will limit the importance of trade with the United States: “1) a projected growth of 
China’s GDP that is 2.5 to 4.5 percentage points higher than the projected growth of the 
GDP of the U.S. and 2) the very limited capacity of the Latin countries to produce the 
kind of high-income goods that are demanded by the U.S. economy.”143 Washington’s 
influence in Latin America has not always led to ‘good’ results. U.S. dissent can be 
expected from Latin America until protectionist trade measures are removed and a more 
balanced playing field is introduced to mutually benefit Washington and the governments 
of Latin America—possibly leading to the FTAA that has dominated the economic 
agenda since the signing of NAFTA. 
3. U.S. Trade with Mexico 
Even though China has supplanted the United States as a leading trade partner in 
some Latin American countries, Mexico continues to benefit from the establishment of 
NAFTA as the primary exporter of manufactured goods north. Although there has been 
an increase in trade and a steadier relationship between Mexico and China, it has not 
always been so seamless. Mexican businesses that rely on trade with the United States 
once saw China as a challenger: “Mexico has viewed China as a competitor, in terms of 
supplying assembled goods to the U.S. market and as a competitor for foreign direct 
investment in the maquiladora or export assembly sector. It fears losing its U.S. market 
share to China.”144 Mexico’s geographic position and opportunity for virtually tariff-free 
trade throughout North America, because of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
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(NAFTA), has made it a popular destination for Chinese manufactured goods, which 
negatively affect the local market.145 For example, “between October 2000 and 
December 2002, Mexicans lost 270,000 manufacturing jobs” to China due to the reduced 
labor costs that originally drew businesses into Mexico from the United States.146 In 
2013, the relationship between Mexico and the PRC was elevated to a comprehensive 
strategic partnership: “The desire by both China and Mexico to deepen the relationship is 
visible in the plethora of initiatives and agreements between the governments since 2013 
to facilitate cooperation in agriculture, tourism, and finance.”147 Although there is a sense 
of optimism in President Enrique Pena Nieto’s administration for stronger ties to the 
PRC, there are still longstanding issues between the two countries that could prevent 
future cooperation. For instance,  
Mexico is one of the countries in the region in which distrust toward both 
Chinese businessmen and ethnic Chinese is most deeply rooted. As far 
back as the Mexican Revolution, anti-Chinese sentiment inspired laws 
such as the prohibition of intermarriage between Chinese and Mexicans. 
Today, Mexicans commonly refer in disparaging terms to low quality 
Chinese products, presumed to be contraband, which allegedly undercut 
the position of Mexican producers and take jobs away from ordinary 
Mexicans.148 
In the end, the Mexican government wants Chinese business, but without the Mexican 
public’s acceptance of China’s growing influence in the country, such political action to 
increase ties between the two countries will be unlikely.  
The other aspect of the Sino-Mexican partnership is the geographic position of 
Mexico to the United States and their long-standing economic ties in North America 
through the effort of NAFTA, entered into law in 1993. This particular free trade 
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agreement laid the groundwork for all future free trade agreements (FTA).149 This 
economic partnership “potentially allows Chinese businesses to use manufacturing 
operations in Mexico as a springboard into the U.S. market (provided domestic content 
provisions can be met).”150 If the Chinese bring in their own labor to staff these 
manufacturing plants in Mexico, which would gain them access to the U.S. economy, 
then there could be repercussions from Mexico for the United States—possibly affecting 
NAFTA. If the United States accepts the Chinese goods that enter the U.S. economy 
through Mexico, then Mexican labor will suffer and could further strain the U.S.-Mexico 
relationship. This, in turn, could lead to a decline in U.S. economic investment as China 
increases their footprint in the region. 
B. U.S.–LATIN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
Until recently, the Monroe Doctrine has guided foreign policy as it concerns 
relationships in Latin America and drove U.S. intervention in the region. This Doctrine 
highlighted the primacy of the United States foreign policy in the Western 
Hemisphere.151 Washington’s self-serving policies originally called for European 
countries to stay out of the Americas and extended beyond Europe as time has gone on in 
an effort to protect U.S. interests throughout the Americas, especially in Latin 
America.152 There have been many examples of interventions and actions justified by the 
Monroe Doctrine through history, such as implementation of the Platt Amendment in the 
Cuban Constitution, the building of the Panama Canal that cut off the isthmus of Central 
America from Colombia, changes in government regimes, and efforts such as Plan 
Colombia. However, “despite the litany of abuses (assumed or real), the United States 
gave cause and breath to real interests and benefits in the region. Those contributions to 
rights and freedoms and to political and economic stability became particularly true in the 
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waning years of the Cold War and the decades after.”153 Examples of such benefits 
include the North American Free Trade Agreement, Plan Colombia, and bilateral support 
of the United States and non-governmental organizations in helping countries provide 
free and fair elections throughout the region. Points of contention against Washington’s 
policies remain such as “a greater willingness to challenge U.S. positions on drug policy 
or question the wisdom of its Cuba policy [but] should not be mistaken for broad-based 
opposition to the United States.”154 Nevertheless, there is some evidence of waning U.S. 
leadership in the region, especially when one looks at regional institutions’ ability to 
resolve intra-regional issues. 
Indications of diminishing U.S. influence can be seen the reduced role of 
U.S.-led institutions such as the Organization of American States in 
resolving important regional issues such as political succession in 
Honduras and Paraguay, the weakened ability of Washington to advance 
its position in key regional forums such as the Summit of the Americas, 
and the proliferation of new sub-regional institutions with explicitly 
exclude the U.S. such as UNASUR and CELAC.
155
 
The ideological push from Washington toward its southern neighbors is to institute 
regionalism—“a vehicle through which to create a stable mode of liberal economic 
governance across an area that has suffered not only severe and dislocating crises, but 
also dramatic policy swings between openness and protectionism.”156 Washington’s 
policies are being met with hesitation as most countries are seeing a growth in 
nationalism and are more focused on domestic concerns. 
Another foreign policy point that remains in effect from the 1980s is the United 
States’ war on drugs. This war—more of a policy than an actual war—has been deemed 
mostly unsuccessful since the drug trade from Latin America north is still a prevalent 
concern. The plans of counter-narcotics and coca eradication have caused concerns for 
peasant farmers throughout the Andean region of South America, leading to insurgent 
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movements to protect the cocaleros and remove U.S. favored governments. The Shining 
Path was an active terrorist group in Peru from the 1980s through 1995 that found an 
opportunity to garner support by offering protection to the coca farmers in the valleys of 
Peru who made a living from drug traffickers and Colombian cartels. The overall goal of 
the Shining Path was to replace the standing government with their left leaning socialist 
ideology, using Maoist tactics to achieve their goals.157 When the Peruvian government, 
sponsored by U.S. agencies began counternarcotic operations eradicating coca fields, 
they lost the hearts and minds of disenfranchised cocaleros, who were losing their 
livelihoods due to the campaign. The Shining Path were able to seize the opportunity and 
gain support throughout the countryside by offering infrastructure and other services not 
being provided by the state, which diminished the effectiveness of the war on drugs and 
reduced the popularity of U.S. initiatives in the region.158 Eventually the strategy shifted 
to concentrate solely on drug traffickers, allowed the coca farmers to grow their 
successful cash crop, and slowly eroded the influence of the Shining Path on the 
peasantry to a point of defeat in 1995. Conversely, in Bolivia, Evo Morales—who is 
supported by the cocaleros in his country and was supported by Hugo Chavez, the anti-
U.S. president of Venezuela—came to power through a democratic election on his 
promise to protect the coca farmers and prevent U.S. intervention in Bolivia. 
Washington’s policy toward drug producing countries has been to support right winged 
governments in an effort keep countries aligned with U.S. ideology and defeat illicit 
trafficking from Latin America. Leaving one to believe that, “Washington would like to 
get rid of all of the left governments in the region and return to a world of ‘limited 
sovereignty’ there that it maintained 20 years ago.”159  
Lastly, U.S. policy dictates the role of the Department of Defense (DOD), 
Department of State (DOS), and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) efforts in 
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preventing illicit trafficking from reaching the United States. Joint Publication 3-27 
directly refers to U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and U.S. Pacific Command 
(PACOM) with the specific responsibilities of homeland defense and defines the other 
combatant commands (COCOM) as supporting actors responsible for actions within their 
own area of operation (AOR). In the United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), 
“the military’s role in the anti-drug effort is largely restricted to surveillance and 
intelligence gathering, communications and training of the police and Federal drug 
agents. Soldiers, sailors and pilots have no power to make arrests.”160 Today’s 
interdiction strategy, Figure 4, depicts the process in dealing with narco-traffickers in the 
maritime realm with the cooperation of partner nations in the region and European allies. 
This process is handled by Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-S), in Key West, 
Florida, a supporting command to SOUTHCOM. The mission of JIATF-S is to conduct 
“interagency and international Detection & Monitoring operations, and facilitates the 
interdiction of illicit trafficking and other narco-terrorist threats in support of national and 
partner nation security.”161 Ideally, the chain depicted below would be coordinated 
through Joint Interagency Task Force South in the following manner involving:  
the application of actionable intelligence to determine the location of a 
suspect drug trafficking vessel. This is combined with detection and 
monitoring by [Customs and Border Patrol] CBP, Defense Department, 
U.S. Coast Guard, or partner nation maritime patrol aircraft (MPA). The 
MPA will then vector in a nearby U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Navy, or allied 
surface asset which, with assistance from a U.S. Coast Guard Law 
Enforcement Detachment, will seize the illicit cargo and arrest the crew.162  
The State Department calls for a layered approach (see Figure 4) in dealing with 
the apprehension of illicit traffickers, and it “begins in foreign ports where the Coast 
Guard conducts foreign port assessments, leveraging the International Port Security 
Program to assess the effectiveness of port security and antiterrorism measures. Offshore, 
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maritime patrol aircraft provide broad surveillance capability enabling cutters and 
[United States Coast Guard] USCG law enforcement detachments [LEDET] embarked on 
U.S. Naval ships and partner nation vessels to respond to potential threats.”163 Air and 
Sea assets of the U.S. Navy, U.S. Air Force, U.S. Coast Guard, and other law 
enforcement entities assist in providing the intelligence necessary for Joint Interagency 
Task Force South to conduct its mission. As the primary mission of anti-drug operations 
are law enforcement actions, the Coast Guard is the lead agency responsible for maritime 
interdiction and is responsible for 52 percent of yearly cocaine interdictions.164  
 
Figure 4.  Drug Interdiction Operations165 
C. MILITARY COOPERATION 
Since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the United States shifted its 
priorities to fight the threat of terrorism. “Facing the development situation of China-
Latin American relations, the American political circle, academic circle, and the media 
claim that China has entered the U.S.’s ‘backyard,’ and that China is occupying the 
‘strategic vacuum’ left behind by the U.S. because of neglect of Latin America after 
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9/11.”166 In an era or reduced spending and redeployment of forces to other geographic 
combatant commands, U.S. Southern Command has turned to increased military-to-
military cooperation in an effort to build partner capacity and achieve the protection of its 
southern approaches from transnational crime. SOUTHCOM is the least-funded 
combatant command and has had to improvise new strategies in combatting transnational 
organized crime in an era of reduced spending. The COCOM’s time and effort in 
building partner capacity is reducing the reliance on U.S. forces in the area of 
responsibility but still producing positive results by stopping transnational organized 
crime from entering the United States. This section will analyze the efforts of building 
partner capacity and military missions to Latin America. 
Building partner capacity is a cornerstone of U.S. military strategy in preventing 
transnational crime into the United States. This effort ensures a larger basis for the 
collection of intelligence, execution of operations, and cooperation in hand-off and 
interdiction of suspected illegal activities. Joint operations with partnership nations allow 
for easier communication and increased presence, especially in an era of reduced 
spending from Washington, which limits U.S. maritime force operations in the Southern 
Command area of responsibility. A fact of operating under U.S. Southern Command is to 
understand that they are the lowest priority Geographic combatant command.167 In 
General Kelly’s Posture Statement before the House Armed Services Committee in 2014, 
he cited that, “insufficient maritime surface vessels and intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance platforms impair our primary mission to detect threats and defend the 
southern approaches to the U.S. homeland.”168 General Kelly further stresses that 
illicit trafficking poses a direct threat to our nation’s public health, safety, 
and border security [adding potentially] … terrorist organizations could 
seek to leverage those same smuggling routes to move operatives with 
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intent to cause grave harm to our citizens or even quite easily bring 
weapons of mass destruction into the United States.169 
Thus, this has led to an increased emphasis on working with and training Latin American 
counterparts.  
Operations have been initiated in the southern hemisphere to mitigate reduced 
U.S. capacity and increase partner ability. Missions such as Operation Martillo, which is:  
The U.S. contribution to the multinational detection, monitoring and 
interdiction operation includes U.S. Navy and Coast Guard vessels, 
aircraft from U.S. federal law enforcement agencies, and military and law 
enforcement units from various nations working together to deny 
transnational criminal organizations the ability to exploit these 
transshipment routes for the movement of narcotics, precursor chemicals, 
bulk cash, and weapons along Central American shipping routes.170 
Operation Martillo has provided an increased interoperable environment and has seen an 
increase in results from partner nations; keeping 66 metric tons of cocaine out of the 
United States in 2013.171 This means, “50 percent of Joint Interagency task Force South’s 
successes would not have occurred without the participation of partner nations.”172 As 
recently as February 2015, “The Dominican Republic’s Navy, Air Force, and National 
Drug Control Police (DNCD) captured two suspected narco-traffickers in connection 
with the seizure of 926 packages of cocaine aboard two boats in separate operations near 
Saona Island earlier this month.”173 Our partner nations include “Belize, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Canada, and the United 
States—along with France, the Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom.”174  
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Another effort run by Southern Command is the Secure Seas Program, which was 
announced by President Obama in 2009. 
The Secure Seas program, began in 2012, falls under the Caribbean Basin 
Security Initiative (CBSI), a regional security partnership initiative … 
Secure Seas aims to facilitate a collective maritime security approach in 
the Eastern Caribbean and enable participating nations to effectively work 
together to counter the regional threats posed by Transnational Organized 
Crime.175 
This program has been instrumental in constructing and improving partner nation’s 
maritime bases, has provided training opportunities from U.S. Navy small boat teams, 
and has donated 42 interceptor patrol boats. All this in the effort of balancing a declining 
force amid a tightening budget; building partner capacity is an opportunity to relieve the 
U.S. burden and create a more sustained force from other countries in the region. 
The United States and China interact with Latin American militaries in different 
ways. The U.S. military’s role in the region is one of U.S. border protection, foreign 
military training, and humanitarian aid/disaster relief. The literature on China’s 
involvement in Latin America is interesting because it is from a competitor outside of 
western society. This is important because China offers a competitive alternative for 
military technology and training for the region, allowing Latin American countries to 
seek the advantage in training and arms sales. What has not changed is that Washington 
still sells arms and provides training throughout Latin America. Although the U.S. has 
reduced deployments to the region, Washington continues to utilize training as an 
opportunity to enhance our partner’s capacity. U.S. commitment to the region is 
displayed in the following figures. Figure 5 displays overall police and military aid in 
U.S. dollars to Latin America from 2003–2016. Until 2010, there was a steady increase in 
military aid to Latin America, 2011 signals the effects of sequestration to the 
SOUTHCOM AOR with a sharp decline in funding. This sharp decline in funding is in 
concert with General Kelly’s examples of how sequestration has hindered his ability to 
combat illicit activity in the southern approaches to the United States. Figure 6 shows 
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U.S. arms sales to Latin America from 2003–2014, showing a net increase from 2003–
2013 followed by a drastic decline to the region from 2013 to 2014. Figure 7 displays 
police and military personnel trained throughout the region from 2003–2013. There has 
been an inconsistent trend with the training of Latin American forces since 2003. 
However, after experiencing a decline in training, the number of personnel trained 
remained steady from 2012 to 2013. As Chapter II explained the increase in Chinese 
military participation in the region, this data shows the United States is still involved, but 
has periods of inconsistencies as dictated by economic conditions. As the previous 
chapter explains the increasing role of the Chinese military throughout South America is 
not related to a perceived decline in Washington’s interest in the region. 
 
Figure 5.  U.S. Military and Police Aid to Latin America 2003–2016 
(Millions of Dollars)176 
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Figure 6.  U.S. Arms Sales to Latin America 2003–2013 
(Billions of Dollars)177 
 
Figure 7.  U.S. Training Provided to Latin American Personnel 2003–2013 
(Thousands of Personnel)178 
In sum, these efforts to build partner capacity have resulted in the decline of 
transnational crime in the southern approaches to the United States. Because of a fiscally 
cautious government, aging maritime assets, and reduced flight hours the United States is 
reliant on strengthening partner nations to help keep the United States safe from those 
who think they can easily infiltrate from the south. Based on the statement of General 
Kelly, if it were not for the efforts of partner nations, the U.S. would have been unable to 
stop approximately 50 percent of drugs SOUTHCOM estimates entered the United States 
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in 2013.179 With a decline in Washington’s ability to pressure transnational criminal 
groups operating in Latin America, its efforts in building partner capacity are paying off. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The United States’ military activity in Latin America has declined. Although the 
United States remains the dominant trade partner in Latin America, high tariffs and other 
protectionist measures have made other international partnerships more ideal for Latin 
American countries to seek. So long as Washington remains unwilling to cooperate 
toward the needs to the region and Latin American countries remain unable to provide the 
higher quality goods and reliable partnerships Washington seeks, then expect continued 
efforts to block the Free Trade Area of the Americas. Washington’s excessive 
interventions in Latin America, exemplified by the Monroe Doctrine and other efforts 
like the military footprint involved in the war on drugs, have helped weaken fledgling 
democratic institutions. As countries in the region have gained support through their own 
regional organizations, participation in international organizations, and expanded 
partnerships abroad, countries throughout Latin America are in a better position today to 
decline U.S. policy initiatives that do not suit their needs. Regional security and 
ultimately U.S. security will continue to drive Washington’s foreign policy agenda 
toward the region. As we see the loosening of sanctions against Cuba, the possibility to 
work more cooperatively with Latin America on security issues, which have been 
blocked in the past because of Washington’s hard line stance against the Communist 
government, may become more viable in the future. The Global War on Terror and an 
aging maritime force has limited the capability of the U.S. Southern Command to operate 
in and around Central and South America. Fiscal restraint, referred to as sequestration, 
has placed SOUTHCOM at the bottom of COCOM priority. However, disadvantaged, 
SOUTHCOM is still finding ways to foster a cooperative environment with Latin 
American militaries and preventing illicit trafficking into the United States. By building 
more capable partners, it reduces the current demand on U.S. forces in the region for the 
time being.  
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IV. CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis addresses the long-term implications of the United States’ declining 
participation in Latin America, combined with China’s increasing interest, especially in 
regards to U.S. national security. This question was approached through a comparative 
analysis of the presence of China and the United States in Latin America. The findings 
suggest that China and the United States will act according to their own self-interest 
while the countries of Latin America are in a better position to choose alliances based on 
what is most advantageous to their needs. Countries throughout Latin America have 
grown away from the idea that they are a part of Washington’s ‘backyard’ and seek the 
best relationships to benefit their economic, political, and military agendas. 
The research proposes that China’s growing influence in Latin America is based 
on self-interest, not decreased U.S. interest, and also not forcing the United States out of 
the region. China offers Latin America a strong and reliable partner outside of the United 
States and this mutually beneficial relationship will most likely foster continued 
cooperation. The going-out policy initiated by China has led to large sums of investment 
along with the commercial growth of industry in the Latin American resource sector. 
Moreover, Beijing’s economic growth has offered Latin American governments a role 
model in economic reform while the failure of the Washington Consensus has further 
solidified the notion that Beijing’s model is more applicable to the governments of Latin 
America. As the PRC grows as a global power they continue to tailor foreign policy 
initiatives to the needs of Latin America demonstrating mutual respect. Continued visits 
to Latin America by high-level dignitaries demonstrate the importance of the relationship 
to China, which was further reinforced by their 2008 policy paper, Confucius Institutes, 
and peer-to-peer exchanges. Military cooperation is also on the rise, filling a void left by 
the United States. U.S. strategy has turned to building the capacity of allied countries 
throughout Latin America, allowing Washington to more closely concentrate on the 
Middle East and the Global War on Terror. All of these dynamics of the Sino-Latin 
American relationship suggest that it will continue to flourish. 
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Furthermore, the United States’ presence is noticeably reduced from the 1990s in 
most areas concerning Latin America. Economically, Latin America has sought 
opportunities to grow within their internal trading blocs, through the European Union, 
and especially with China. Washington’s reluctance to lower tariffs and its other 
protectionist measures have made international partnerships outside of the U.S. necessary 
for continued economic growth for Latin American countries. The United States is still an 
attractive trade partner for many in the region, but the opportunities presented by other 
partnerships have allowed Latin America to grow independently from the United States. 
So long as Washington and Latin American countries remain unwilling to cooperate 
towards the needs of the other, closer economic ties, like those offered through the 
FTAA, are unlikely to come to fruition. Washington’s reactionary and interventionist 
approaches in Latin America are often cited as hurting the newer democratic institutions 
throughout the region. As countries in Latin America have gained support through their 
own regional organizations, through participation in international organizations, and 
through expanded partnerships abroad, they have also gained a better position to decline 
U.S. policy initiatives that do not suit their needs. However, the United States has an 
opportunity to re-evaluate policies toward Latin America and rebuild weakened 
partnerships, as attempted before the attacks of September 11, 2001. U.S. economic 
growth in concert with the rest of the Americas will only benefit the parties involved and 
aid increasing regional stability. Ultimately, U.S. security will continue to drive 
Washington’s foreign policy agenda, or lack thereof, in the region. 
How China’s increasing footprint in the Western Hemisphere will affect U.S. 
security in the region is yet to be seen. Policy papers, academic literature, and media 
coverage often portray a growing Chinese presence, but that growing presence does not 
correlate with a diminished U.S. security environment. To the contrary, the literature has 
shown that the Chinese act cautiously to not provoke a military response from 
Washington. However, I believe there is enough evidence to support the claim that as the 
presence of China increases in the Western Hemisphere, the ability of the United States 
to enact policy and garner support from hemispheric neighbors is diminishing with the 
benefits offered by Beijing. The benefits of the economic partnership alone have directly 
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influenced countries in Latin America to shift their diplomatic recognition from Republic 
of China to the People’s Republic of China. Based on this precedence, if a vote came 
before the United Nation Security Council that placed the United States and the PRC on 
opposite sides of the argument, one may expect the temporary members of the United 
Nations Security Council to act against the interests of the United States if the PRC 
willed it. With the U.S. economy only growing at half the rate of the PRC’s, 
Washington’s ability to compete in dollar diplomacy is at a disadvantage. The U.S. 
government is operating at a reduced capacity, a constrained budget, the low priority 
assigned to U.S. Southern Command, and the lack of organic assets assigned to U.S. 
Fourth Fleet compound to an inability for the United States to seek an improved political 
relationship between Washington and the governments of Latin America.  
A. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
At this juncture in the U.S.-Latin American relationship, Washington has taken a 
major step forward in improving its status with the region. Loosening the sanctions and 
restarting an open dialog with Cuba has shown Latin America that Washington can 
change and adjust its policies. It may be time for Washington to address its protectionist 
trade measures. Although the aims of the measures are to protect U.S. industry they have 
been damaging to the agricultural trade sector for Latin American exports. As Jean B. 
Grugel describes in his comparison of U.S. and EU trade policies towards Latin America, 
the United States has addressed some of the measures on a bilateral basis as a reward for 
economic liberalization in adhering to the U.S. policies.180 He continues that the FTAA 
looks, “from the Latin American perspective, to be turning into simply a device for 
strengthening the U.S.’s presence and U.S. investments within Latin America in 
something of a zero-sum game.”181 This approach with Latin American countries may 
need to be reconsidered at the regional level in order to work toward strengthening 
economic partnerships and could finally lead to a successful construction of an FTAA.  
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In addition to the economic perspective, other efforts to show a greater 
commitment to Latin America could be initiated through military-to-military cooperation. 
In 2008, when the U.S. Navy re-established the Fourth Fleet in an effort to display how 
important the United States considered building maritime partnerships, ensuring regional 
security, and maintaining stability was a positive political step that may have been 
overshadowed by the lack of organic assets to the Fleet. General Kelly has continuously 
outlined the decline in naval assets in his yearly Posture Statements, as the U.S. Navy has 
been decommissioning their fleet of Oliver Hazard Perry Class Frigates, which have 
frequented the Fourth Fleet AOR in anti-drug operations. In turn, the answer has been to 
build partner capacity and rely on U.S. allies to carry out the mission to combat illicit 
trafficking through the maritime domain. Reinvigorating the U.S. Fourth Fleet would 
increase the capacity of SOUTHCOM to defend the southern approaches of the United 
States, display a commitment to Latin America by increasing the importance the United 
States places on the region, and display the importance of combatting illicit trafficking in 
the hemisphere. Furthermore, the Combatant Commands show a clear distinction 
between North and South America, a consideration could be to consolidate efforts for 
regional security and stability and combine NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM as one 
combatant command. The consolidation of the two commands may reduce the costs of 
maintaining two commands that are charged with the defense of the approaches to the 
United States and show solidarity towards Latin America. 
B. POSSIBLE FUTURE RESEARCH 
There are many more areas of research that could be explored for future work on 
this topic. One recommendation would be the study of the bilateral relationship between 
China and the United States in individual countries throughout Latin America, showing 
economic and military aid/cooperation trends. The research conducted in this thesis has 
been limited by the broad approach taken to identify regional trends. A closer analysis of 
specific countries in Latin America, how or if they have embraced China’s commitment 
to them compared to the United States, would narrow down specific policy 
recommendations for the United States with specific countries at the bilateral level. These 
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recommendations may offer a more concise approach in how the United States applies 
policies to each country or the region. 
Further security studies research could examine the threat of the increased 
Chinese footprint in the Western Hemisphere, especially in the event of potential conflict. 
The Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance also known as the Rio Treaty defines the 
responsibilities of those signed to the obligation of mutual assistance, where an attack on 
one is an attack on all states of the Americas in order to promote regional solidarity.182 
After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the OAS enacted the Rio Treaty: “all 
States Party to the Rio Treaty shall provide effective reciprocal assistance to address such 
attacks and the threat of any similar attacks against any American state, and to maintain 
the peace and security of the continent.”183 
Lastly, based on the policy recommendation of the possibility of combining 
NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM, Operations Research analysis could determine the cost 
benefit analysis of this consolidation. If the Department of Defense could save money in 
operating costs it could increase deployments throughout the hemisphere and increase the 
success of catching illicit traffickers. Other research could be designed around whether 
combining NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM under one combatant command would 
increase solidarity throughout the Americas and if it could improve the impression of the 
United States in Latin America.  
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